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ABSTRACT - STRESZCZENIE
This paper is concerned with the apparent greatest weakness of the Mathematical
Theory of Evidence (MTE) of Shafer [27], which has been strongly criticized by Wasser-
man [37] - the relationship to frequencies.
Weaknesses of various proposals of probabilistic interpretation of MTE belief functions
are demonstrated.
A new frequency-based interpretation is presented overcoming various drawbacks of ear-
lier interpretations.
1 Introduction
Wasserman in [37] raised serious concerns against the Mathematical Theory of Evidence
(MTE) developed by Dempster and Shafer since 1967 - hence also called Dempster-Shafer-
Theory (DST) (see [30] for a thorough review of this theory, for major formal definitions
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see Appendix A). One of arguments against MTE is related to Shafer’s attitude towards
frequencies. Shafer in [30] claims that probability theory developed over last years from the
old-style frequencies towards modern subjective probability theory within the framework
of Bayesian theory. By analogy he claims that the very attempt to consider relation
between MTE and frequencies is old-fashioned and out of date and should be at least
forbidden - for the sake of progress of humanity. Wasserman opposes this view ([37],
p.371) reminding ”major success story in Bayesian theory”, the exchangeability theory
of de Finetti [4]. It treats frequencies as special case of Bayesian belief. ”The Bayesian
theory contains within it a definition of frequency probability and a description of the
exact assumptions necessary to invoke that definition” [37]. Wasserman dismisses Shafer’s
suggestion that probability relies on analogy of frequency. .
Shafer, on the other hand, lets frequencies live a separate life. MTE beliefs and
frequencies are separated. But in this way we are left without a definition of frequentistic
belief function [37].
This paper is devoted to discussion of drawbacks of various interpretations of MTE.
A way out is proposed in a separate paper, the summary of our proposal is contained in
Appendix B.
2 Basic Problems with Frequencies in MTE
Shafer in [28], [29] gave the following formal probabilistic interpretation of belief function:
Let Pr be a probabilistic measure over the infinite discrete sample space Ω, let Γ be a
function Γ : Ω→ 2Ξ. Then Bel over the space (frame of discernment) Ξ is given as:
Bel(A) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) ⊆ A})
Then clearly
m(A) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) = A})
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and
P l(A) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) ∩A 6= ∅})
Let us consider the database in Table 1.
Table 1: Example of Γ function
No. A D Γ
1 a1 d1 {d1}
2 a2 d2 {d2, d3}
3 a2 d3 {d2, d3}
4 a3 d3 {d3}
5 a4 d1 {d1}
Let the measurable A take values a1, a2, a3, a4, and let the non-observable attribute
D take values d1, d2, d3. Let us define the function Γ as capability to predict values
of attribute D given A and let us calculate it based on training sample contained in
Table 1. We see that if A takes value a1, then we know that D takes value d1 - hence
Γ(A = a1) = {d1}. Similarly values a3 and a4 of attribute A determine uniquely the value
of attribute D. But in case of A = a2 we have an ambiguity: D is equal either d2 or d3.
Hence Γ(A = a1) = {d2, d3}. Now, assuming frequency probabilities from Table 1 we
calculate easily from Shafer’s formula:
m({d1}) = 0.4 Bel({d1}) = 0.4 P l({d1}) = 0.4
m({d2}) = 0 Bel({d2}) = 0 P l({d2}) = 0.4
m({d3}) = 0.2 Bel({d3}) = 0.2 P l({d3}) = 0.6
m({d1, d2}) = 0 Bel({d1, d2}) = 0.4 P l({d1, d2}) = 0.8
m({d1, d3}) = 0 Bel({d1, d3}) = 0.6 P l({d1, d3}) = 1
m({d2, d3}) = 0.4 Bel({d2, d3}) = 0.6 P l({d2, d3}) = 0.6
m({d1, d2, d3}) = 0 Bel({d1, d2, d3}) = 1 P l({d1, d2, d3}) = 1
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In probability theory two variables are independent if Pr(A ∩ B) = Pr(A) · Pr(B).
Let us consider two measurables A and B from Table 2.
Function Γ be, as previously, be prediction of value of variable D based on value of A,
and Γ′ be prediction of variable D given value of B. Let us define
Bel(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) ⊆ Z})
Bel′(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ′(ω) ⊆ Z})
Let us imagine that we want to combine information from attributes A and B to
improve prediction of D by formulating a new function Γ” being the base for a new belief
function:
Bel”(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ”(ω) ⊆ Z})
As observations being basis of functions Γ and Γ′ are obviously independent, so one
would expect that the belief function Bel” is simply the combination OF INDEPENDENT
EVIDENCE Bel and Bel′ via Dempster rule. And this is in fact the case:
Bel” = Bel ⊕ Bel′
But there is one weak point in all of this: Bel′ is (and will always be) a vacuous belief
function, hence it does not contribute anything to our knowledge of the value of the at-
tribute. Reverting this example we can say that whenever we combine two non-vacuous
belief functions, then the measurements underlying their empirical calculation are for sure
statistically dependent. So we claim that:
Under Shafer’s frequentist interpretation, if two belief functions are (statistically) inde-
pendent then at least one of them is non-informative.
Another practical limitation of Shafer’s probabilistic interpretation is consideration of
conditional beliefs. Let as look at Table 3.
If we want to calculate conditional probability of A = a1 given observation that A
takes only one of values a1 or a2, we select cases from the database fitting the condition
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Table 2: Example of Γ′ function for a variable B independent of A
No. A B D Γ Γ′
1 a1 b1 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
2 a2 b1 d2 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
3 a2 b1 d3 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
4 a3 b1 d3 {d3} {d1, d2, d3}
5 a4 b1 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
6 a1 b2 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
7 a2 b2 d2 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
8 a2 b2 d3 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
9 a3 b2 d3 {d3} {d1, d2, d3}
10 a4 b2 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
11 a1 b3 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
12 a2 b3 d2 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
13 a2 b3 d3 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
14 a3 b3 d3 {d3} {d1, d2, d3}
15 a4 b3 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
16 a1 b4 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
17 a2 b4 d2 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
18 a2 b4 d3 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
19 a3 b4 d3 {d3} {d1, d2, d3}
20 a4 b4 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
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Table 3: Scheme of creation of conditional probability
No. A A = a1 ∨ A = a2 A|A = a1 ∨A = a2
1 a1 yes a1
2 a2 yes a2
3 a2 yes a2
4 a3 no −
5 a4 no −
Table 4: Example of conditioning in MTE
No. A D Γ Γ ∩ {d1, d2} Γ
′ =
6= ∅ Γ ∩ {d1, d2}
1 a1 d1 {d1} yes {d1}
2 a2 d2 {d2, d3} yes {d2}
3 a2 d3 {d2, d3} yes {d2}
4 a3 d3 {d3} no −
5 a4 d1 {d1} no −
A = a1 ∨ A = a2, and thereafter within this subset we calculate frequency probabilities:
Pr(A = a1|A = a1 ∨ A = a2) = 1/3 = 0.33.Now, based on Table 4 let us run similar
procedure for MTE beliefs.
Let us assume that we want to find out our degree of belief in values of D given
that only values d1 or d2 are allowed. For this purpose we restrict the set of cases to
those cases Ω′ for which our function Γ has non-empty intersection with the set of val-
ues of interest. For this group of cases we define the function Γ′(ω) = Γ(ω)∩{d1, d2}. Let :
Bel(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) ⊆ Z})
Bel′(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω′|Γ′(ω) ⊆ Z})
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Additionally let us define the simple support function Bel” such thatm”({d1, d2}) = 1.
It is easily seen that:
Bel′ = Bel ⊕Bel”
(as expected because the expression Bel ⊕ Bel”means shaferian conditioning on event
{d1, d2}). And everything would be O.K. if it were not that the function Γ
′ has little to
do with the non-observable attribute D - compare line no.3 of Table 4. Let us remind that
function Γ represented by definition for a given observed value of variable A the set of
potentially possible values of attribute D, deducible from the training sample. For every
object ω, if we know the true value a of A one of the values from the set Γ(ω) was the
true value of D for this object ω. But within Γ′(ω) the true value of attribute D does not
need to be contained - compare line no.3 of Table 4. But, let us remind, Shafer claimed
[28, 29] that function Γ indicates that the variable takes for object ω one of the values
Γ(ω). But we have just demonstrated that already after a single step of conditioning
function Γ′ simply tells lies. Its meaning is not dependent solely on subpopulation Ω′, to
which it refers, but also on the history, how this population was selected. But we had for
probability distributions that after conditioning a variable for not rejected objects took
always those values which were indicated by the result of conditioning.
Both above failures of Shafer’s probabilistic interpretation of his own theory of evi-
dence were driving forces behind the elaboration of a new probabilistic interpretation of
MTE presented subsequently.
We shall summarize this section saying that: Shafer’s probabilistic interpretation of
Dempster’s & Shafer’s Mathematical Theory of Evidence is not compatible with this theory:
It does not fit the Dempster’s rule of combination of independent evidence. .
As statistical properties of Shafer’s [27] notion of evidence are concerned, further
8 MIECZYS lAW A. K lOPOTEK AND ANDRZEJ MATUSZEWSKI
criticism has been expressed by Halpern and Fagin ([11] in sections 4-5). Essentially the
criticism is pointed there at the fact that ”the belief that represents the joint observation is
equal to the combination is in general not equal to the combination of the belief functions
representing the individual (independent) observations” (p.297). The other point raised
there that though it is possible to capture properly in belief functions evidence in terms
of probability of observations update functions (section 4 of [11]), it is not possible to do
the same if we would like to capture evidence in terms of beliefs of observations update
functions (section 5 of [11]).
3 Smets’ Approach to Frequencies
Smets [34] has made some strong statements in defense of the Dempster-Shafer theory
against sharp criticism of this theory by its opponents as well as unfortunate users of the
MTE who wanted to attach it to the ”dirty reality” (that is objectively given databases).
He insisted on Bels not being connected to any empirical measure (frequency, probability
etc.) considering the domain of MTE applications as the one where ”we are ignorant of the
existence of probabilities”, and not one with ”poorly known probabilities” ([34], p.324).
The basic property of probability, which should be dropped in the MTE axiomatization,
should be the additivity of belief measures. Surely, it is easy to imagine situations where -
in the real life - the additivity is not granted: Imagine we have had a cage with 3 pigs, we
put into it 3 hungry lions two hours ago, how many animals are there now ? (3 + 3 < 6).
Or ten years ago we left one young man and one young woman on an island in the middle
of the atlantic ocean with food and weapons sufficing for 20 years. How many human
beings are there now ? (1 + 1 > 2).
The trouble is, however, that the objects stored in databases of a computer behave usually
(under normal operation) in an additive manner. Hence the MTE is simply disqualified
for any reasoning within human collected data on real world, if we accept the philosophy
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of Smets and Shafer.
The question may be raised at this point, what else practically useful can be obtained
from a computer reasoning on the basis of such a MTE. If the MTE models, as Smets
and Shafer claim, human behaviour during evidential reasoning, then it would have to be
demonstrated that humans indeed reason as MTE. We take e.g. 1000 people who never
heard of Dempster-Shafer theory, briefly explain the static component, provide them with
two opinions of independent experts and expect of them to answers what are their final
beliefs. Should their answers correspond to results of the MTE (at least converge toward
them), then the computer, if fed with our knowledge, would be capable to predict our
conclusions on a given subject. However, to our knowledge, no experiment like this has
ever been carried out. Under these circumstances the computer reasoning with MTE
would tell us what we have to think and not what we think. But we don’t suspect that
anybody would be happy about a computer like this.
Hence, from the point of view of computer implementation the philosophy of Smets
and Shafer is not acceptable.Compare also Discussion in [11] on the subject.
Smets felt a bit uneasy about a total loss of reference to any scientific experiment
checking practical applicability of the MTE and suggested some probabilistic background
for decision making (e.g. the pigeonistic probabilities of Smets), but we are afraid that
by these interpretations he falls precisely into the same pitfalls he claimed to avoid by his
highly abstract philosophy.
As Smets probabilistic interpretations are concerned, let us ”continue” the killer exam-
ple of [34] on pages 330-331. ”There are three potential killers, A, B, C. Each can use a gun
or a knife. We shall select one of them, but you will not know how we select the killer.
The killer selects his weapon by a random process with p(gun)=0.2 and p(knife)=0.8.
Each of A, B, C has his own personal random device, the random devices are unrelated.
...... Suppose you are a Bayesian and you must express your ”belief” that the killer will
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use a gun. The BF (belief function) solution gives Bel(gun) = 0.2 × 0.2 × 0.2 = 0.008.
..... Would you defend 0.2 ? But this applies only if I select a killer with a random device
...... But we never said we would use a random device; we might be a very hostile player
and cheat whenever we can. ... . So you could interpret Bel(x) as the probability that
you are sure to win whatever Mother Nature (however hostile) will do.”
Yes, we will try to continue the hostile Mother Nature game here. For completeness
we understand that Bel(knife) = 0.83 = 0.512 and Bel({gun, knife}) = 1. But sup-
pose there is another I, the chief of gangster science fiction physicians, making deci-
sions independly of the chief I of the killers. The chief I of physicians knows of the
planned murder and has three physicians X,Y,Z. Each can either rescue a killed man or
let him die. I shall select one of them, but you will not know how I select the physi-
cian. The physician, in case of killing with a gun, selects his attitude by a random
process with p(rescue|gun) = 0.2 and p(let die|gun) = 0.8 and he lets the person die
otherwise. Each of X, Y, Z has his own personal random device, the random devices
are unrelated. ...... Suppose you are a Bayesian and you must express your ”belief”
that the physician will rescue if the killer will use a gun. The BF (belief function)
solution gives Bel1(rescue|gun) = 0.2
3 = 0.008. Bel1(let die|gun) = 0.8
3 = 0.512,
Bel1({recue, let die}|gun) = 1. Also Bel2(let die|knife) = 1. As the scenarios for Bel1
and Bel2 are independent, let us combine them by the Dempster rule: Bel12 = Bel1⊕Bel2.
We make use of the Smets’ claim that ”the de re and de dicto interpretations lead to the
same results” ([34], p. 333), that is Bel(A|B) = Bel(¬B ∨ A). Hence
m12({(gun, let die), (knife, let die), (gun, rescue)}) = 0.480
m12({(gun, rescue), (knife, let die)}) = 0.008
m12({(knife, let die), (gun, let die)}) = 0.512
Now let us combine Bel12 with the original Bel. We obtain:
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m⊕m12((gun, let die) = 0.008 · 0.480 + 0.008 · 0.512 = 0.008 · 0.992
But these two unfriendly chiefs of gangster organizations can be extremely unfriendly
and in fact your chance of winning a bet may be as bad as 0.008 · 0.512 for the event
(gun, let die). Hence the ”model” proposed by Smets for understanding beliefs functions
as ”unfriendly Mother Nature” is simply wrong. If the Reader finds the combination of
Bel2 with the other Bels a little tricky, then for justification He should refer to the paper
of Smets and have a closer look at all the other examples.
Now returning to the philosophy of ”subjectivity” of Bel measures: Even if a human
being may possess his private view on a subject, it is only after we formalize the feeling
of subjectiveness and hence ground it in the data that we can rely on any computer’s
”opinion”. We hope we have found one such formalization in this paper. The notion of
labeling developed here substitutes one aspect of subjective human behaviour - if one has
found one plausible explanation, one is too lazy to look for another one. So the process
of labeling may express our personal attitudes, prejudices, sympathies etc. The inter-
pretation drops deliberately the strive for maximal objectiveness aimed at by traditional
statistical analysis. Hence we think this may be a promising path for further research
going beyond the DS-Theory formalism.
Smets [34] views the probability theory as a formal mathematical apparatus and hence
puts it on the same footing as his view of the MTE. However, in our opinion, he ignores
totally one important thing: The abstract concept of probability has its real world coun-
terpart of relative frequency which tends to behave approximately like the theoretical
probability in sufficiently many experimental settings as to make the abstract concept
of probability useful for practical life. And a man-in-the-street will expect of the MTE
to possess also such a counterpart or otherwise the MTE will be considered as another
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version of the theory of counting devils on a pin-head.
It is worth mentioning that Smets made recently an attempt to justify usage of be-
lief functions instead of Bayesian probabilities, to identify situations in which usage of
belief functions is more reasonable than usage of probabilities [36]. However, the data
modifying impact of application of Dempster-rule is not explicitly recognized there and
numerical examples presented there deliberately avoid situations where more than one
belief function may have more than one focal point.
4 MTE and Random Sets
The canonic random set interpretation [20] is one with a statistical process over set instan-
tiations. The rule of combination assumes then that two such statistically independent
processes are run and we are interested in their intersections. This approach is not sound
as empty intersection is excluded and this will render any two processes statistically de-
pendent. We overcome this difficulty assuming in a straightforward manner that we are
”walking” from population to population applying the Rule of Combination. Classical DS
theory in fact assumes such a walk implicitly or it drops in fact the assumption that Bel()
of the empty set is equal 0. In this sense the random set approaches may be considered
as sound as ours.
However, in many cases the applications of the model are insane. For example, to
imitate the logical inference it is frequently assumed that we have a Bel-function describing
the actual observed value of a predicate P(x), and a Bel-function describing the implication
”If P(x) then Q(x)” [17]. It is assumed further that the evidence on the validity of both
Bel’s has been collected independently and one applies the DS-rule of combination to
calculate the Bel of the predicate Q(x). One has then to assume that there is a focal
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m of the following expression: m({(P (x), Q(x)), (¬P (x), Q(x)), (¬P (x),¬Q(x))}) which
actually means that with non-zero probability at the same time P (x) and ¬P (x) hold for
the same object as we will see in the following example: Let Bel1 represent our belief in
the implication, with focal points:
m1(P (x)→ Q(x)) = 0.5, m1(¬(P (x)→ Q(x))) = 0.5,
Let further the independent opinion Bel2 on P(x) be available in the form of focal points:
m2(P (x)) = 0.5, m2(¬P (x)) = 0.5
Let Bel12 = Bel1 ⊕ Bel2 represent the combined opinions of both experts. The focal
points of Bel12 are:
m12({(P (x), Q(x))}) = 0.33, m12({(P (x),¬Q(x))}) = 0.33,
m12({(¬P (x), Q(x)), (¬P (x),¬Q(x))}) = 0.33
m12({(P (x), Q(x))}) = 0.33 makes us believe that there exist objects for which both
P(x) and Q(x) holds. However, a sober (statistical) look at expert opinions suggests that
all situations for which the implication P (x) → Q(x) holds, must result from falsity of
P (x), hence whenever Q(x) holds then ¬P (x) holds. These two facts combined mean that
P(x) and its negation have to hold simultaneously. This is actually absurdity overseen
deliberately. The source of this misunderstanding is obvious: the lack of proper definition
of what is and what is not independent. Our interpretation allows for sanitation of this
situation. We are not telling that the predicate and its negation hold simultaneously.
Instead we say that for one object we modify the measurement procedure (set a label) in
such a way that it, applied for calculation of P (x), yields true and at the same time for
another object, with the same original properties we make another modification of mea-
surement procedure (attach a label to it) so that measurement of ¬P (x) yields also true,
because possibly two different persons were enforcing their different beliefs onto different
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subsets of data.
Our approach is also superior to canonical random set approach in the following sense:
The canonical approach requires knowledge of the complete random set realizations of two
processes on an object to determine the combination of both processes. We, however, post-
pone the acquisition of knowledge of the precise instantiation of properties of the object
by interleaving the concept of measurement and the concept of labeling process. This
has a close resemblance to practical processing whenever diagnosis for a patient is made.
If a physician finds a set of hypotheses explaining the symptoms of a patient, he will
usually not try to carry out other testing procedures than those related to the plausible
hypotheses. He runs clearly at risk that there exists a different set of hypotheses also
explaining the patients’s symptoms, and so a disease unit possibly present may not be
detected on time, but usually the risk is sufficiently low to proceed in this way, and the
cost savings may prove enormous.
5 Upper and Lower Probabilities
Still another approach was to handle Bel and Pl as lower and upper probabilities [5]. This
approach is of limited use as not every set of lower and upper probabilities leads to Bel/Pl
functions [16], hence establishing a unidirectional relationship between probability theory
and the DS-theory. Under our interpretation, the Bel/Pl function pair may be considered
as a kind of interval approximations to some ”intrinsic” probability distributions which,
however, cannot be accessed by feasible measurements and are only of interest as a kind
of qualitative explanation to the physical quantities really measured.
Therefore another approach was to handle them as lower/upper envelops to some prob-
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ability function realization [16], [9]. However, the DS rule of combination of independent
evidence failed.
6 Inner and Outer Measures
Still another approach was to handle Bels/Pl in probabilistic structures rather than in
probabilistic spaces [8]. Here, DS-rule could be justified as one of the possible outcomes
of independent combinations, but no stronger properties were available. This is due to
the previously mentioned fact that exclusion of empty intersections renders actually most
of conceivable processes dependent. Please notice that under our interpretation no such
ambiguity occurs. This is because we not only drop empty intersecting objects but also
relabel the remaining ones so that any probability calculated afterwards does not refer to
the original population.
So it was tried to drop the DS-rule altogether in the probabilistic structures, but then
it was not possible to find a meaningful rule for multistage reasoning [11]. This is a very
important negative outcome. As the Dempster-Shafer-Theory is sound in this respect and
possesses many useful properties (as mentioned in the Introduction), it should be sought
for an interpretation meeting the axiomatic system of DS Theory rather then tried to vio-
late its fundamentals. Hence we consider our interpretation as a promising one for which
decomposition of the joint distribution paralleling the results for probability distributions
may be found based on the data.
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7 Rough Set Approach
An interesting alternative interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer Theory was found within
the framework of the rough set theory [32], [10]. Essentially the rough set theory searches
for approximation of the value of a decision attribute by some other (explaining) at-
tributes. It usually happens that those attributes are capable only of providing a lower
and upper approximation to the value of the decision attribute (that is the set of vectors
of explaining attributes supporting only this value of the decision variable, and the set of
vectors of explaining attributes supporting also this value of the decision variable resp.-
for details see texts of Skowron [32] and Grzyma la-Busse [10]). The Dempster Rule of
combination is interpreted by Skowron [33] as combination of opinions of independent ex-
perts, who possibly look at different sets of explanation attributes and hence may propose
different explanations.
The difference between our approach and the one based on rough sets lies first of all
in the ”ideological” background: We assume that the ”decision attribute” is set-valued
whereas the rough-set approach assumes it to be single-valued. This could have been
overcome by some tricks which will not be explained in detail here.But the combination
step is here essential: If we assume that the data sets for forming knowledge of these two
experts are exhaustive, then it can never occur that these opinions are contradictory. But
the MTE rule of combination uses the normalization factor for dealing with cases like this.
Also the opinions of experts may have only the form of a simple (that is deterministic)
support function. Hence, rough-set interpretation implies axioms not actually present in
the MTE. Hence rough set interpretation is on the one hand restrictive, and on the other
hand not fully conforming to the general MTE. From our point of view the MTE would
change the values of decision variables rather then recover them from expert opinions.
Here, we come again at the problem of viewing the independence of experts. The
MTE assumes some strange kind of independence within the data: the proportionality
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of the distribution of masses of sets of values among intersecting subsets weight by their
masses in the other expert opinion. Particularly unfortune is the fact for the rough set
theory, that given a value of the decision variable, the respective indicating vectors of
explaining variables values must be proportionally distributed among the experts not
only for this decision attribute value, but also for all the other decision attribute values
that ever belong to the same focal point. Hence applicability of the rough set approach is
hard to justify by a simple(, ”usual” as Shafer wants) statistical test. On the other hand,
statistical independence required for Dempster rule application within our approach can
be easily checked.
To demonstrate the problem of rough set theory with combination of opinions of inde-
pendent experts let us consider an examle of two experts having the combined explanatory
attributes E1 (for expert 1) and E2 (for expert 2) both trying to guess the decision at-
tribute D. Let us assume that D takes one of two values: d1, d2, E1 takes one of three
values e11, e12, e13, E2 takes one of three values e21, e22, e23. Furthermore let us assume
that the rough set analysis of an exhaustive set of possible cases shows that the value e11
of the attribute E1 indicates the value d1 of the decision attribute D, e12 indicates d2, e13
indicates the set {d1, d2}, Also let us assume that the rough set analysis of an exhaustive
set of possible cases shows that the value e21 of the attribute E2 indicates the value d1 of
the decision attribute D, e22 indicates d2, e32 indicates the set {d1, d2}, From the point
of view of Bayesian analysis four cases of causal influence may be distinguished (arrows
indicate the direction of dependence).
E1 → D → E2
E1 ← D ← E2
E1 ← D → E2
E1 → D ← E2
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From the point of view of Bayesian analysis, in the last case attributes E1 and E2
have to be unconditionally independent, in the remaining cases: E1 and E2 have to be
independent conditioned on D. Let us consider first unconditional independence of E1
and E2. Then we have that (For meaning of
Prob
P (ω)
ω
see Appendix B):
(
ProbP (ω)
ω
E1(ω) = e11 ∧ E2(ω) = e22) =
= (
ProbP (ω)
ω
E1(ω) = e11) · (
ProbP (ω)
ω
E2(ω) = e22) > 0
However, it is impossible that (Prob
P (ω)
ω
E1(ω) = e11 ∧ E2(ω) = e22) > 0 because we have
to do with experts who may provide us possibly with information not specific enough,
but will never provide us with contradictory information. We conclude that unconditional
independence of experts is impossible.
Let us turn to independence of E1 and E2 if conditioned on D. We introduce the following
denotation:
p1 =
ProbP (ω)
ω
D(ω) = d1
p2 =
ProbP (ω)
ω
D(ω) = d2
e′1 =
Prob(D(ω)=d1)∧P (ω)
ω
E1(ω) = e11
e′3 =
Prob(D(ω)=d1)∧P (ω)
ω
E1(ω) = e13
f ′1 =
Prob(D(ω)=d1)∧P (ω)
ω
E2(ω) = e21
f ′3 =
Prob(D(ω)=d1)∧P (ω)
ω
E2(ω) = e23
e2” =
Prob(D(ω)=d2)∧P (ω)
ω
E1(ω) = e12
e3” =
Prob(D(ω)=d2)∧P (ω)
ω
E1(ω) = e13
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f2” =
Prob(D(ω)=d2)∧P (ω)
ω
E2(ω) = e22
f3” =
Prob(D(ω)=d2)∧P (ω)
ω
E2(ω) = e23
Let Bel1 and m1 be the belief function and the mass function representing the knowledge
of the first expert, let Bel2 and m2 be the belief function and the mass function represent-
ing the knowledge of the second expert. Let Bel12 and m12 be the belief function and the
mass function representing the knowledge contained in the combined usage of attributes
E1, E2 if used for prediction of D - on the grounds of the rough set theory. It can be
easily checked that:
m1({d1}) = e
′
1 · p1, m1({d2}) = e2” · p2, m1({d1, d2}) = e
′
3 · p1,+e3”
′ · p2
m2({d1}) = f
′
1 · p1, m2({d2}) = f2” · p2, m2({d1, d2}) = f
′
3 · p1,+f3”
′ · p2
and if we assume the conditional independence of E1 and E2 conditioned on D, then we
obtain:
m12({d1}) = e
′
1 · f
′
1 · p1 + e
′
1 · f
′
3 · p1 + e
′
3 · f
′
1 · p1
m12({d2}) = e2” · f2” · p2 + e2” · f3” · p2 + e3” · f2” · p2
m12({d1, d2}) = e
′
3 · f
′
3 · p1 + e3” · f3” · p2
However, the Dempster rule of combination would result in (c - normalization constant):
m1 ⊕m2({d1}) = c · (e
′
1 · f
′
1 · p
2
1 + e
′
1 · f
′
3 · p
2
1 + e
′
1 · f3” · p1 · p2 + e
′
3 · f
′
1 · p
2
1 + e3” · f
′
1 · p1 · p2)
m1⊕m2({d2}) = c · (e2” ·f2” ·p
2
2+e2” ·f
′
3 ·p1 ·p2+e2” ·f3” ·p
2
2+e
′
3 ·f2” ·p1 ·p2+e3” ·f2” ·p
2
2)
m1 ⊕m2({d1, d2}) = c · e
′
3 · f
′
3 · p
2
1 + e3” · f3” · p
2
2 + e
′
3 · f3” · p1 · p2 + e3” · f
′
3 · p1 · p2)
Obviously, Bel12 andBel1⊕Bel2 are not identical in general. We conclude that conditional
independence of experts is also impossible. Hence no usual staatistical indeperndence
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assumption is valid for the rough set interpretation of the MTE. This fact points at where
the difference between rough set interpretation and our interpretation lies in: in our
interpretation, traditional statistical independence is incorporated into the Dempster’s
scheme of combination (labelling process).
By the way, lack of correspondence between statistical independence and Dempster
rule of combination is characteristic not only for the rough set interpretation, but also of
most of the other ones, e.g. [13, 35]. The Reader should read carefully clumsy statements
of Shafer about MTE and statistical independence in [29].
8 Probability of Provability
Now we draw attention to the way several authors are writing about ”independence of
experts’ opinions”. Smets [35] suggests that independence in MTE should be understood
intuitively in terms of experts independence - only intuitively, as was shown in the previous
section. Hummel and Landy [13] give still more curious account of expert independence: It
is a (totally ignorant) ”committee” that combines opinions of experts which, it supposes,
are independent.
We think that, what is really meant behind those clumsy expert opinion independence
notions, has been correctly and explicitly stated is the probability of provability approach
[22, 23]. The probability of provability approach means the following: we have a deter-
ministic state of affairs. We have experts that make deterministic (categoric) statements
about the state of affairs, each statement stemming from a different expert. To derive any
theorem about the world we use propositional calculus. However, we know that experts
may make errors (independently of one another), that is that their statements may be
actually wrong. So each proposition is assigned a probability of being correct. What
MTE achieves under this interpretation (if we refrain from normalization) is calculation
of probability that the proof of our final statement is correct. First notice, that we do
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not calculate the probability that the statement itself is correct (this probability will
be usually higher). Then imagine what space of events is considered for calculating or
guessing the expert’s reliability. We are not concerned with any actual set of observa-
tions, but rather with the set of observations together with sets of opinions expressend
by each expert on each observation. And we are not building a world model but rather a
model of the set of experts. And to reason about a new event we cannot rely on previous
knowledge (as we do not derive it), but on experts’ opinions (which we then valuate with
experience about experts’ reliability). A statistical evaluation will be rather hard under
such circumstances. First of all how an error of an expert could be treated ? Should be a
more specific error be considered the same way as an error in a more general statement or
not ?. Last not least we lose any statistical information about the real world behaviour
under such interpretation.
9 General Remarks
The Dempster-Shafer Theory exists already over two decades. Though it was claimed to
reflect various aspects of human reasoning, it has not been widely used in expert systems
until recently due to the high computational complexity. Three years ago, however, an
important paper of Shenoy and Shafer [31] has been published, along with papers of other
authors similar in spirit, which meant a break-through for application of both Bayesian
and Dempster-Shafer theories in reasoning systems, because it demonstrated that if joint
(Bayesian or DS) belief distribution can be decomposed in form of a belief network than
it can be both represented in a compact manner and marginalized efficiently by local
computations.
This fact makes them suitable as alternative fundamentals for representation of (un-
certain) knowledge in expert system knowledge bases [12].
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Reasoning in Bayesian belief networks has been subject of intense research work also
earlier [26], [31], [19], [21]. There exist methods of imposing various logical constraints on
the probability density function and of calculating marginals not only of single variables
but of complicated logical expressions over elementary statements of the type X =x (x
belonging to the domain of the variable X ) [21]. There exist also methods determining
the decomposition of a joint probability distribution given by a sample into a Bayesian
belief network [3], [24], [1].
It is also known that formally probability distributions can be treated as special cases
of Dempster-Shafer belief distributions (with singleton focal points) [11].
However, for application of DS Belief-Functions for representation of uncertainty in
expert system knowledge bases there exist several severe obstacles. The main one is the
missing frequentist interpretation of the DS-Belief function and hence neither a compari-
son of the deduction results with experimental data nor any quantitative nor even qualita-
tive conclusions can be drawn from results of deduction in Dempster-Shafer-theory based
expert systems [17].
Numerous attempts to find a frequentist interpretation have been reported (e.g. [8], [9],
[10], [11], [16], [29], [32]). But, as Smets [34] states, they failed either trying to incorporate
Dempster rule or when explaining the nature of probability interval approximation. The
Dempster-Shafer Theory experienced therefore sharp criticism from several authors in
the past [21], [11]. It is suggested in those critical papers that the claim of MTE to
represent uncertainty stemming from ignorance is not valid. Hence alternative rules of
combination of evidence have been proposed. However, these rules fail to fulfill Shenoy-
Shafer axioms of local computation [31] and hence are not tractable in practice. These
failures of those authors meant to us that one shall nonetheless try to find a meaningful
frequentist interpretation of MTE compatible with Dempster rule of combination.
We have carefully studied several of these approaches and are convinced that the
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key for many of those failures (beside those mentioned by Halpern in [11]) was: (1)
treating the Bel-Pl pair as an interval approximation and (2) viewing combination of
evidence as a process of approaching a point estimation. In this paper we claim that the
most reasonable treatment of Bel’s Pl’s is to consider them to be POINT ESTIMATES
of probability distribution over set-valued attributes (rather then interval estimates of
probability distribution over single valued attributes). Of course, we claim also that Bel-
Pl estimates by an interval some probability density function but in our interpretation that
”intrinsic” probability density function is of little interest for the user. The combination
of evidence represents in our interpretation manipulation of data by imposing on them
our prejudices (rather then striving for extraction of true values).
Under these assumptions a frequentionistically meaningful interpretation of the Bel’s
can be constructed (Appendix B), which remains consistent under combination of joint
distribution with ”evidence”, giving concrete quantitative meaning to results of expert
system reasoning. Within this interpretation we were able to prove the correctness of
Dempster-Shafer rule. This means that this frequentist interpretation is consistent with
the DS-Theory to the largest extent ever achieved.
Finally, we feel obliged to apologize and to say that all critical remarks towards inter-
pretations of MTE elaborated by other authors result from deviations of those interpre-
tations from the formalism of the MTE. We do not consider, however, a deviation from
MTE as a crime, because modifications of MTE may and possibly have a greater practical
importance than the original theory. The purpose of this paper was to shed a bit more
light onto the intrinsic nature of pure MTE and not to call for orthodox attitudes towards
MTE.
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Appendix A: Formal Definitions of MTE
Let Ξ be a finite set of elements called elementary events. Any subset of Ξ be a composite event.
Ξ be called also the frame of discernment.
A basic probability assignment function m:2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A∈2Ξ
|m(A)| = 1
m(∅) = 0
∀A∈2Ξ 0 ≤
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
(|.| - absolute value).
A belief function be defined as Bel:2Ξ → [0, 1] so that Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆Am(B) A plausibility
function be Pl:2Ξ → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ξ Pl(A) = 1 − Bel(Ξ − A). A commonnality function be
Q:2Ξ → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ξ Q(A) =
∑
A⊆Bm(B)
Furthermore, a Rule of Combination of two Independent Belief Functions Bel1, Bel2 Over
the Same Frame of Discernment (the so-called Dempster-Rule), denoted
BelE1,E2 = BelE1 ⊕BelE2
is defined as follows: :
mE1,E2(A) = c ·
∑
B,C;A=B∩C
mE1(B) ·mE2(C)
(c - constant normalizing the sum of |m| to 1)
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Whenever m(A) > 0, we say that A is the focal point of the Bel-function. If the only focal
point of a belief function is Ξ (m(Ξ) = 1), then Bel is called vacuous belief function (it does not
contain any information on whatever value is taken by the variable).
Appendix B: Review of the New Interpretation of MTE
(A summary of the paper [14]). Prob
P (x)
x
α(x) - the probability of α(x)] being true within
the population P. The P (population) is a unary predicate with P(x)=TRUE indicating that
the object x(∈ Ω, that is element of a universe of objects) belongs to the population under
considerations. If P and P’ are populations such that ∀xP
′(x) → P (x) (that is membership in
P’ implies membership in P, or in other words: P’ is a subpopulation of P), then we distinguish
two cases:
case 1: (Prob
P (x)
x
P ′(x)) = 0 (that is probability of membership in P’ with respect to P is equal
0) - then (according to [18] for any expression α(x) in free variable x the following holds for the
population P’: (Prob
P
′(x)
x
α(x)) = 1
case 2: (Prob
P (x)
x
P ′(x)) > 0 then (according to [18] for any expression α(x) in free variable x
the following holds for the population P’:
(
ProbP
′(x)
x
α(x)) =
Prob
P (x)
x
(α(x) ∧ P ′(x))
Prob
P (x)
x
P ′(x)
Definition 1 X be a set-valued attribute taking as its values non-empty subsets of a finite
domain Ξ. By a measurement method of value of the attribute X we understand a function:
M : Ω× 2Ξ → {TRUE,FALSE}
where Ω is the set of objects, (or population of objects) such that
• ∀ω;ω∈Ω M(ω,Ξ) = TRUE (X takes at least one of values from Ξ)
• ∀ω;ω∈Ω M(ω, ∅) = FALSE
• whenever M(ω,A) = TRUE for ω ∈ Ω, A ⊆ Ξ then for any B such that A ⊂ B
M(ω,B) = TRUE holds,
• whenever M(ω,A) = TRUE for ω ∈ Ω, A ⊆ Ξ and if card(A) > 1 then there exists B,
B ⊂ A such that M(ω,B) = TRUE holds.
• for every ω and every A either M(ω,A) = TRUE or M(ω,A) = FALSE (but never
both).
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M(ω,A) tells us whether or not any of the elements of the set A belong to the actual value of
the attribute X for the object ω.
Definition 2 A label L of an object ω ∈ Ω is a subset of the domain Ξ of the attribute X.
A labeling under the measurement method M is a function l : Ω → 2Ξ such that for any object
ω ∈ Ω either l(ω) = ∅ or M(ω, l(ω)) = TRUE.
Each labelled object (under the labeling l) consists of a pair (ωj, Lj), ωj - the j
th object,
Lj = l(ωj) - its label.
By a population under the labeling l we understand the predicate
P : Ω → {TRUE,FALSE} of the form P (ω) = TRUE iff l(ω) 6= ∅ (or alternatively, the
set of objects for which this predicate is true)
If for every object of the population the label is equal to Ξ then we talk of an unlabeled population
(under the labeling l), otherwise of a pre-labelled one.
Definition 3 Let l be a labeling under the measurement method M . Let us consider the popu-
lation under this labeling. The modified measurement method
Ml : Ω× 2
Ξ → {TRUE,FALSE}
where Ω is the set of objects, is is defined as
Ml(ω,A) =M(ω,A ∩ l(ω))
(Notice that Ml(ω,A) = FALSE whenever A ∩ l(ω) = ∅.)
Definition 4
BelMP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
(¬M(ω,Ξ−A))
which is the probability that the test M, while being true for A, rejects every hypothesis of the
form X=vi for every vi not in A for the population P. We shall call this function ”the belief
exactly in the result of measurement”.
Definition 5
PlMP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
(M(ω,A))
which is the probability of the test M holding for A for the population P. Let us refer to this
function as the ”Plausibility of taking any value from the set A”.
Definition 6
mMP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
(
∧
B;B={vi}⊆A
M(ω,B) ∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬M(ω,B))
which is the probability that all the tests for the singleton subsets of A are true and those outside
of A are false for the population P.
THEOREM 1 mMP is the mass Function in the sense of DS-Theory.
THEOREM 2 BelMP is a Belief Function in the sense of DS-Theory corresponding to the m
M
P .
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THEOREM 3 PlMP is a Plausibility Function in the sense of DS-Theory and it is the Plausi-
bility Function corresponding to the BelMP .
Definition 7 Let P be a population and l its labeling. Then
Bel
Ml
P (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
¬Ml(ω,Ξ−A)
Pl
Ml
P (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
Ml(ω,A)
m
Ml
P (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
(
∧
B;B={vi}⊆A
Ml(ω,B) ∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬Ml(ω,B))
THEOREM 4 m
Ml
P is the mass Function in the sense of DS-Theory.
THEOREM 5 Bel
Ml
P is a Belief Function in the sense of DS-Theory corresponding to the
m
Ml
P .
THEOREM 6 Pl
Ml
P is a Plausibility Function in the sense of DS-Theory and it is the Plau-
sibility Function corresponding to the BelMlP .
Definition 8 Let M be a measurement method, l be a labeling under this measurement method,
and P be a population under this labeling (Note that the population may also be unlabeled). The
(simple) labelling process on the population P is defined as a functional LP : 2Ξ×Γ→ Γ, where
Γ is the set of all possible labelings under M , such that for the given labeling l and a given
nonempty set of attribute values L (L ⊆ Ξ), it delivers a new labeling l′ (l′ = LP(L, l)) such
that for every object ω ∈ Ω:
1. if Ml(ω,L) = FALSE then l
′(ω) = ∅
(that is l’ discards a labeled object (ω, l(ω)) if Ml(ω,L) = FALSE
2. otherwise l′(ω) = l(ω) ∩ L (that is l’ labels the object with l(ω) ∩ L otherwise.
Definition 9 ”labelling process function” mLP;L : 2Ξ → [0, 1]: is defined as:
mLP;L(L) = 1
∀B;B∈2Ξ,B 6=Lm
LP;L(B) = 0
THEOREM 7 mLP;L is a Mass Function in sense of DS-Theory.
THEOREM 8 Let M be a measurement function, l a labeling, P a population under this
labeling. Let L be a subset of Ξ. Let LP be a labeling process and let l′ = LP(L, l). Let P’ be
a population under the labeling l′. Then Bel
M
l′
P ′ is a combination via DS Combination rule of
BelMl, and BelLP;L., that is:
Bel
M
l′
P ′ = Bel
Ml
P ⊕Bel
LP;L
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Definition 10 LetM be a measurement method, l be a labeling under this measurement method,
and P be a population under this labeling (Note that the population may also be unlabeled). Let
us take a set of (not necessarily disjoint) nonempty sets of attribute values {L1, L2, ..., Lk} and
let us define the probability of selection as a function mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk : 2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A;A⊆Ξ
mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk(A) = 1
∀A;A∈{L1,L2,...,Lk}m
LP,L1,L2,...,Lk(A) > 0
∀A;A 6∈{L1,L2,...,Lk}m
LP,L1,L2,...,Lk(A) = 0
The (general) labelling process on the population P is defined as a (randomized) functional
LP : 22
Ξ
× ∆ × Γ → Γ, where Γ is the set of all possible labelings under M , and ∆ is a set
of all possible probability of selection functions, such that for the given labeling l and a given
set of (not necessarily disjoint) nonempty sets of attribute values {L1, L2, ..., Lk} and a given
probability of selection mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk it delivers a new labeling l” such that for every object
ω ∈ Ω:
1. a label L, element of the set {L1, L2, ..., Lk} is sampled randomly according to the probabil-
ity distribution mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk; This sampling is done independently for each individual object,
2. if Ml(ω,L) = FALSE then l”(ω) = ∅
(that is l” discards an object (ω, l(ω)) if Ml(ω,L) = FALSE
3. otherwise l”(ω) = l(ω) ∩ L (that is l” labels the object with l(ω) ∩ L otherwise.)
THEOREM 9 mLP,L
1,...,Lk is a Mass Function in sense of DS-Theory.
THEOREM 10 Let M be a measurement function, l a labeling, P a population under this
labeling. Let LP be a generalized labeling process and let l” be the result of application of the LP
for the set of labels from the set {L1, L2, ..., Lk} sampled randomly according to the probability
distribution mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk;. Let P” be a population under the labeling l”. Then The expected
value over the set of all possible resultant labelings l” (and hence populations P”) (or, more
precisely, value vector) of BelMl”P” is a combination via DS Combination rule of Bel
Ml
P , and
BelLP,L
1,...,Lk., that is:
E(Bel
M ′
l
P” ) = Bel
Ml
P ⊕Bel
LP,L1,...,Lk
